Public employment in most developing countries is governed by political patronage.
The review's corresponding findings are ambiguous. Studies usefully demonstrate that reform rarely results from pressure from organized interests -be these civil society organizations, businesses, public sector unions or donors. Instead, the calculus of incumbents weighing governability and electoral advantage under patronage and reform is central. Studies point to numerous socio-economic and political-institutional factors which can shape this calculus. Practitioners would do well to consider them in their analyses.
Robust inferences about their explanatory weight, mechanisms and signs of effects are largely precluded, however: scholars disagree about them. This reflects a more general shortcoming in the state reform literature in which 'it has been impossible to approach a consensus as to the factors that produce or make possible a successful statebuilding effort.' (Kurtz 2013, p. 5 ) Even single cases -most prominently the U.S. case -have seen a range of explanations. This suggests that a confluence of multiple factors -rather than single causes -are typically required to incentivize reform. Future reform accounts would thus do well to pay greater attention to interactions between multiple causes.
In part, however, inconsistent findings also stem from a failure to differentiate which reform studies explain. Few patronage reform roads lead to Weber: distinct Weberian reforms -such as merit and tenure -are poorly correlated. Competing hypotheses result partially from oblivion to this insight: they inadvertently conflate distinct reforms and thus explain different dependent variables. Future studies should thus develop distinct explanations for distinct civil service reforms of patronage states.
Review: What Causes Patronage Reform?
To structure the review, studies are heuristically categorized into socio-economic (demandside) and political-institutional (supply-side) explanations (table 1) . 
Socio-Economic Explanations
Socio-economic explanations revolve around demands from organized interests and voters.
Organized interests.
Four organized interests take centre stage: civil society, businesses, bureaucrats and donors.
Early accounts of the U.S. case in particular focused on civil society coalitions mobilizing public opinion and reformist legislators against corrupt patronage systems (Theriault 2003) .
Businesses, at times, joined these efforts. Business transactions could benefit from reform to secure functioning public services and credible commitments to predictable regulation and enforcement (Miller 2000) . More recently, development assistance organizations (donors) have come to the forefront. The World Bank, for instance, supports governance reforms in 140 countries (Andrews 2013) . Donor conditionalities for aid flows or EU accession and normative pressure stemming from greater legitimacy of international 'good governance' practices may incentivize reform (Goetz 2001) . Lastly, bureaucrats may demand reform.
Political discretion jeopardizes their job stability, career paths and societal legitimacy (Silberman 1993) . Entrepreneurial bureaucrats may thus press for reform by exploiting executive-legislative rivalries or ties with interest groups and media (Johnson and Libecap 1994, Carpenter 2001) . These arguments notwithstanding, most studies attribute little causal leverage to patronage reform demands from organized interests. With citizen collective action challenges, the 'broad mobilization of citizens … in reform [is] an anomaly' and largely limited to the U.S. case (Grindle 2012, p. 29) . Businesses typically demand reform only for institutions central to business transactions, such as central banks or regulatory agencies (Heredia and Schneider 2003) . Moreover, businesses -when benefitting from (illicit) state contracts -may oppose rather than demand reform. Similarly, donors play an 'often quite marginal' role in governance reforms (Andrews 2013, p. 209) . Approval cultures weaken conditionalities, focused on formal mimicry rather than reform in practice. Aid also relaxes patronage budget constraints, thus dis-incentivizing the professionalization of tax administration (Mwenda and Tangri 2005) . Bureaucrats for their part typically lack the ability to press for reform. Politicians may dismiss bureaucrats seeking collective employee action for reform. Bureaucrats thus typically rise as interest groups only after reforms curb political power over careers (Johnson and Libecap 1994) .
Voter demand.
More than organized interests, changing voter preferences for public and private goods can alter the electoral payoffs of patronage and reform -and thus act as proximate reform incentives. Weberian bureaucracies are associated with greater public goods provision: skilled public servants selected based on professional merit -rather than political affiliationcan deliver higher quality services to the electorate (Rauch 1995) . By contrast, patronage facilitates the provision of private, excludable goods -including the exchange of state jobs for votes. Whether voters demand public or private goods from governments depends in part on their socio-economic situation. Socio-economic shifts which shift voter preferences towards public goods may thus incentivize reform.
Most prominently, greater income, education and private employment alternatives may heighten voter demand for public goods and patronage reform (Reid and Kurth 1989, Calvo and Murillo 2004) . Wealthier and more educated voters with private employment alternatives derive less utility from patronage jobs and are more willing to forego immediate patronage offers in favour of longer-term public service improvements Page 6 of 25 Public Administration through competent bureaucracies. Patronage thus becomes a less effective strategy to mobilize votes. Moreover, urbanization and migration may alter voter preferences. Ethnicitybased cleavages may complicate programmatic left-right competition and facilitate ethnicitybased patronage machines (Ruhil 2003) . They may, however, also lead to excessive patronage demands and attempts by ethnic outsiders not favoured by patronage machines to reform (Ruhil and Camões 2003) .
Several studies thus explain the transition away from patronage through socioeconomic shifts. Others, however, only attribute a 'weak and inconsistent' role to them (Remmer 2007, p. 374) . The under-provision of public goods in patronage states impairs the very socio-economic shifts which would cause patronage reform. Moreover, public goodsoriented politicians are frequently not elected: their promises lack credibility in patronage states (Keefer 2007) . Most importantly, any aggregation of shifting voter preferences into reform choices depends on political-institutional factors. Hence, these factors have seen most studies.
Political-Institutional Explanations
Political-institutional explanations for patronage reform revolve around four sets of factors:
(i) electoral competition; (ii) party organization; (iii) political institutions; and (iv) patronage budget constraints.
3 Scholars disagree about their weight, mechanisms and signs of causal effects.
Electoral Competition.
Patterns of electoral competition have seen most studies. By increasing the threat of electoral defeat, electoral competition may incentivize governments to reform to (i) insure themselves against patronage access -and thus electoral advantage -of hostile successor governments (Horn 1995) . Moreover, with electoral competition -and credible opposition parties -voters count on a clear alternative to punish incumbents seeking excessive patronage (O'Dwyer 2006) . Electoral competition also enhances the likelihood of party parity. With equal access to patronage, reform imposes similar patronage losses on parties while allowing incumbents to claim small electoral gains from improved public goods provision (Geddes 1996) . Likewise, party parity enables reformist factions to 'play balance of power politics,'
offering pivotal electoral support in return for reform (Shefter 1993, p. 73) .
At the same time, however, electoral competition may dis-incentivize reform through several mechanisms. Party Organization.
The role of party organizations is equally contested. In one account, stronger and more programmatic party organizations incentivize reform: their public goods promises are more (Blum 2014, Cruz and Keefer 2015) . Yet, stronger party organizations may also administer patronage more effectively: monitoring and enforcing patronage contracts with voters requires well-organized machines (Grzymala-Busse 2007) . Similarly, the lack of party organizations -due to elections of outsider Presidents -can induce or thwart reform.
Outsiders rising to power despite opposition of established party leaders may, variably, seek reform to undercut the patronage power base of their legislative opponents (Geddes 1996) ; or maximize patronage to construct parties of their own (Philip and Panizza 2011) . Less controversially, the election of parties with wealthier and more educated constituents may reduce the attractiveness of patronage (Calvo and Murillo 2004) .
Political Institutions.

Disagreement also extends to political institutions. Among electoral institutions, open-list systems have been argued to incentivize patronage: incumbents compete against not only
candidates from other parties from whom they can distinguish themselves through programmatic appeals; but also candidates from their own party from whom differentiation through patronage is central (Geddes 1996) . The limited large-n evidence on patronage reform, however, finds no effect of electoral institutions (Blum 2014, Cruz and Keefer 2015) .
The same holds for systems of democratic governance. Parliamentarism and unitarism may facilitate reform by reducing the number of veto players (Kenny 2015) ; or incentivize patronage by imposing fewer checks on incumbents (Asare 2012 ). Yet, available large-n evidence finds no effect (Blum 2014, Cruz and Keefer 2015) . Rather than broad differences in democratic systems, specific institutional designs of patronage states may then matter.
Where parliaments rather than executives hold patronage powers and electoral challengers control parliament, executives are argued to face greater reform incentives to deprive challengers of patronage access (Schuster 2016 ).
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Patronage Budget Constraints.
Finally, scholars also disagree about the role of fiscal budget constraints. Fiscal crises may induce reform by curtailing political power of actors with vested patronage interests (Bunse and Fritz 2012) . Fiscally-induced reforms, however, typically focus on containing payrolls rather than undoing political discretion (Heredia and Schneider 2003) . At the same time, rising budgets and employment may induce principal-agent problems as local patronage workers become further removed from top patrons; and rising transaction costs, with appointments consuming excessive time of Presidents and other top patrons. Reform thus becomes more incentive-compatible (Johnson and Libecap 1994) . Yet, rising budgets may also create fiscal space for, concurrently, patronage concessions to secure governability and professional recruitment -and thus enable reform (Geddes 1996) .
What Can -and Cannot -Be Learned from the Literature about the Causes of Patronage Reform?
Which political factors robustly incentivize -and thus enable -civil service reforms? The review suggests the literature provides some insights in this regard. Studies usefully demonstrate that reform rarely results from pressure from organized interests -be these civil society organizations, businesses, public sector unions or development aid organizations.
Instead, the political calculus of incumbents weighing the electoral and governability payoffs of patronage and civil service reform takes centre explanatory stage. Voter preferences for public and private goods matter for this calculus, as do -in particular -political-institutional factors. Theory building and practitioner 'political analyses' should thus usefully build on and include these two sets of factors. Practitioners should, similarly, limit optimism about civil service reform prospects in countries in which these socio-economic and politicalinstitutional factors do not change: reform will remain politically-irrational.
While the literature thus usefully circumscribes the socio-economic and political-institutional factors which shape reform incentives, it falls short of robust inferences about their specific causal roles. Instead, the literature features competing hypotheses about mechanisms and signs of causal effects of most factors -be these different political institutions or patterns of electoral competition, for instance. In that sense then, patronage reform remains 'most poorly understood.' (Fukuyama 2014, p. 26) The multiplicity of competing hypotheses for a rare phenomenon -patronage reform -has also yielded a multiplicity of explanations for single cases. To illustrate, scholars have argued that reform in the U.S. was caused by civic reform movements, principal-agent problems in patronage networks, the rise of an outsider President facing congressional control over patronage and incentives to 'blanket in' party appointees, among others (Johnson and Libecap 1994 , Ruhil and Camões 2003 , Theriault 2003 , Schuster 2016 .
Giving credence to these explanations suggests that a confluence of factors -rather than single causes -are typically required to incentivize reform. Future studies would thus do well to pay greater attention to interactions between multiple causes as a means to resolve competing hypotheses.
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In part, however, inconsistent findings also stem from a failure to differentiate which reform studies explain. As detailed next, different civil service reforms feature different determinants. A 'poor understanding' of patronage reform results partially from oblivion to this insight.
The Causes of Patronage Reform Depend on the Type of Civil Service Reform
In most studies, patronage vs. civil service reform (or politicization vs. insulation/autonomy) is a dichotomous choice (see, among many, Nistotskaya 2009, Ting, Snyder et al. 2013) . 'Reform' is assumed to coincide with 'Weberianness:' the concurrence of merit, tenure and depoliticized pay (Evans and Rauch 1999, p. 748) . 5 Yet, this conflation assumption is empirically unwarranted. Merit and tenure (r=0.14), merit and pay structures (r=-0.37) and tenure and pay structures (r=0.07) are only weakly correlated in global expert survey and national public pay data. In fact, as illustrated by the confidence intervals in figures 1 and 2, there are no statistically significant differences between merit at high and low levels of bureaucratic tenure and pay decompression respectively. Competing hypotheses stem partially from oblivion to this insight. Electoral competition hypotheses are illustrative. In one set of studies, electoral competition incentivizes reform. Facing a potential exit from office, incumbents are argued to advance reform to 'blanket in' appointees to secure their continued employment; reduce patronage available to successors; and enhance the durability of legislative decisions by assuring sympathetic bureaucrats remain in office (Horn 1995 , Ruhil and Camões 2003 , GrzymalaBusse 2007 , Ting, Snyder et al. 2013 . In a second set of studies, electoral competition is argued to dis-incentivize reform. Reducing political time horizons, it limits the ability of incumbents to reap longer-term state capacity benefits from reform (Geddes 1996, Lapuente and Nistotskaya 2009 ).
Note, though, that these are not competing hypotheses, but hypotheses to account for distinct dependent variables. Locking in legislative deals, blanketing in partisans and constraining the patronage budgets of hostile successors all require, principally, tenure for appointees. Instead, reaping longer-term state capacity benefits requires, principally, competent bureaucrats through meritocratic recruitment and promotion. In fact, merit -yet not tenure -correlates with public goods gains in cross-country studies (Evans and Rauch 1999, Dahlström, Lapuente et al. 2012 ).
Organized interest explanations may be similarly clarified by disaggregating distinct reforms into distinct explananda. Bureaucrats, for instance, are more likely to demand tenure and predictable pay to protect themselves from political discretion. In contrast, civil society, businesses and donors are arguably more interested in state capacity building through meritocratic recruitment and promotion.
In short then, distinct patronage reforms feature distinct politics. The implications of this -and the review's remaining findings -are discussed next.
Implications for the Study of Patronage Reform
Over the last three decades, numerous studies have examined the politics of patronage reform. This article was the first to review them. It found that the literature has usefully identified a range of socio-economic and political-institutional factors which may shape reform incentives. The causal roles of many factors -including the signs of their effectsremain contested, however.
Future studies should usefully focus on resolving this contestation. This review offers two guideposts to this end. First, the multiplicity of (competing) single-cause explanations for a rare reform suggests future studies would benefit from greater attention to interactions between multiple causes. Second, the differential politics shown to underlie distinct civil service reforms put a premium on developing and testing distinct explanations for distinct patronage reforms.
This latter lesson arguably extends to the politics of good government reforms at-large -be these different types of civil service, anti-corruption or freedom of information reforms, for instance. To-date, studies have not paid systematic attention to differentiating common from reform type-specific explanations. As a result, it often remains unclear which hypotheses explain which types of good government reforms. Paying closer and comparative attention to differential reforms could thus enhance the robustness of inferences about the determinants of institutional reform in the developing world. 
